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1CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
The design of a decentralized control scheme for a large scale 
system will, in the formulation of the problem, generally take advantage 
of some aspect of the structure of the system [16,17,18] or the problem 
may be formulated so that a desired structure is imposed on the system, e.g., 
[19,20,21,12].
Controller are generally implemented in some form of state feed­
back. Since many aspects of the system structure are variant under the 
control actions, the dependence of the decentralized control schemes on the 
structure maker many of the schemes crucially dependent on a uniformity of 
the goals of the individual decision makers.
In many situations, the individual decision makers will have 
different goals and it may be infeasible to have cooperation in agreeing on 
a common, single goal. So, given that there may exist multiple goals, it 
is of interest to analyze the decentralized control problem in this setting.
We will examine issues arising from the presence of conflicting 
goals among the decentralized controllers. The rational behavior of the 
controller is characterized by a strategy defining the rules of their 
behavior. Of primary interest to us will be the role that the Stackelberg 
strategy can play in the decentralized control problem and a number of 
conceptual issues that arise in attempting to make use of the strategy.
The Stackelberg strategy is well suited for use in designing a 
coordination scheme where there are many controllers acting on the system, 
each with a different criterion to be optimized. There are, however, some
2issues regarding the strategy which have yet to be resolved. Among these 
are the fact that the principle of optimality does not in general hold and 
its imposition for the continuous time case has yet to be satisfactorily 
dealt with. Also, unlike the classic single criterion linear quadratic 
problem, a closed form solution satisfying the necessary conditions or a 
satisfactory numerical solution technique have yet to be developed. In 
Chapter 2 we develop a sampled data equilibrium strategy which provides 
a computationally tractable solution technique.
This coordination technique is prescriptive, i.e., if a solution 
exists, it provides the methodology for calculating it. The existence of 
a solution is not assured. In an effort to establish conditions under 
which we can insure the existence of a solution satisfying the Stackelberg 
strategy, Chapter 3 will examine a very basic form of the Stackelberg 
strategy for dynamic games and sufficient conditions for the existence of a 
stabilizing solution will be developed. We restrict our attention to a 
formulation dealing with a linear continuous time system and in which the 
control laws are constrained to be linear state feedback. For this class 
of problems we are able to rely on the concepts of linear algebra to analyze 
the interaction of the individual decision maker's controllable and observ­
able subspaces. By so doing we establish sufficient conditions under which 
the existence of a stabilizing solution can be assured.
Another form of the Stackelberg strategy will be seen in the 
remaining chapters, entering into the design of an information structure.
The problem considered is one in which there are many controllers acting
on a system where each controller has a different objective and their controls
3are determined according to the Nash equilibrium strategy. An example 
demonstrating the impact of the information structure is considered in 
Chapter 4. This is an example of a situation in which the availability 
of more information to one of the controllers has the effect of making 
that controller worse off. The demonstrated impact of the information struc­
ture in the example serves as motivation for the information structure 
design scheme of the next chapter.
In Chapter 5 we consider the design of an improved information 
structure by a somewhat unsuspected use of the Stabkelberg strategy. An 
iterative procedure is developed by which the information structure is 
altered to improve the overall system performance. The advantages inherent 
in the precedence nature of decision making under the Stackelberg strategy
will be seen in this formulation.
4CHAPTER 2
SAMPLED DATA EQUILIBRIUM STACKELBERG COORDINATION
2.1, Introduction
In this section, we consider the problem of formulating a 
hierarchical control structure for a multicontroller problem using the 
differential game concept of an equilibrium Stackelberg strategy. It is 
assumed that in general each agent has a different objective function and 
that one agent, the coordinator and Stackelberg leader, has an overall 
objective function.
There have been numerous investigations recently into the useful­
ness and characteristics of the Stackelberg strategy applied to dynamic 
systems [1-11]. In particular, the use of the Stackelberg strategy for the 
coordination of many agents has been considered in [4] and [11].
A form of periodic coordination has been considered by Chong and 
Athans [12] in which the vertical communication in the hierarchy is con­
strained to be periodic. Our basic assumptions are different from those of 
[12] and subsequently the nature of the solutions are quite dissimilar.
With a Stackelberg strategy, we assure it is known that one player, 
the coordinator and Stackelberg leader, will determine his controls before 
any of the other players (followers or lower level decisionmakers). The 
lower level decisionmakers then perform their optimization subject to their 
knowledge of the coordinator's decision, that is, they are reacting to his 
decision. The followers act simultaneously and we consider the case when 
they play a Nash strategy among themselves. The leader performs his 
optimization subject to the expected reactions of the followers. The leader's
5ability to make decisions first, taking into account the reactions of the 
lower level decisionmakers, enables him, to a degree, to impose his 
criterion onto the other controllers.
This strategy is appropriate for imposing a control structure 
on a problem in which there are many decision makers with different 
criteria unable or unwilling to cooperate in their decision making process 
and in which a hierarchy of decision making already exists or can be 
imposed.
The solution of the closed loop Stackelberg problem generally 
depends on the length of the interval over which the problem is defined as 
well as the state of the system at the initial time [8]. Implicit in the 
solution is a guarantee by the leader that he will not deviate from his 
announced control rule. If the problem is redefined on a subinterval of 
the time interval of the original problem, the solutions on this interval 
would in general be different. Thus, the principle of optimality does not, 
in general, hold.
The feedback Stackelberg strategy is defined as a closed loop 
Stackelberg strategy which has the added constraint that the leader's control 
is required to satisfy the principle of optimality [8]. Generalization to 
equilibrium Stackelberg strategies is introduced in [7]. Further discussion 
of the Nash and Stackelberg strategies for dynamic games can be found in 
the references.
The open loop, closed loop, feedback and sampled data Stackelberg 
strategies exhibit notably different characteristics due to the fact that 
they are based on fundamentally different problem formulations. In order
6to see the motivation and significance of the sampled data formulation it 
is necessary to appreciate two particular aspects of the continuous time 
Stackelberg problem.
First, as described above, the solution of the closed loop 
Stackelberg problem for dynamic games does n&t, in general, satisfy the 
principle of optimality. The imposition of the principle of optimality for 
discrete time games has been considered in [8] while the procedure for doing 
this for continuous time games has yet to be resolved.
A second peculiarity of the closed loop Stackelberg problem is 
that, unlike the classic single agent, linear quadratic control problem, or 
even certain multicontroller problems, the necessary conditions derived by 
the variational technique for the linear quadratic, continuous time, closed 
loop Stackelberg problem result in a nonlinear control, the existence of 
which is not assured [6], [16].
With these aspects of the continuous time Stackelberg problem in 
mind, the significance of the sampled data formulation is apparent. That 
is, the resultant control laws are piecewise continuous linear time varying 
functions of the measurements for the linear quadratic case and, as we have 
formulated it, the principle of optimality holds at the sampling times.
Recent work on the Stackelberg strategy for continuous time dynamic 
systems has concentrated primarily on the open loop formulation [4] and on 
the linearly constrained closed loop formulation [6], For the linear 
quadratic case, the open loop solution is a linear function of the initial 
condition and the solution in [6] is linear by construction but the 
principle of optimality does not, in general, hold. The linear form of the
7sampled data solution is a direct result of this information constraint and 
is not due to any structural (linear) constraint being imposed on the form 
of the solution.
By considering the sampled data formulation we have been able to 
obtain a responsive state feedback solution, which is tractable, has a 
very simple form for implementation, and for which the principle of optima­
lity holds at the sampling times. Of equal importance is the existence of 
an efficient algorithm for the calculation of this solution. In this chapter 
we derive a computationally efficient technique for obtaining the solution 
for the linear quadratic sampled data equilibrium Stackelberg strategy.
The solution algorithm tends (i) to minimize the on-line computations and 
(ii) to take advantage of the nature of the sampled data solution to greatly 
reduce the horizon over which integrations must be performed, thereby 
reducing off-line computations as well. These features are obtained as a 
result of employing a form of invariant imbedding [13].
In Section 2.2 we formulate the problem and present necessary 
conditions for the solution. The linear quadratic case will be considered 
in Section 2.3 and techniques for the solution of the linear quadratic case 
will be discussed in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 summarizes the results.
2.2. Sampled Data Equilibrium Stackelberg Formulation
Consider the system
x — f(x,u_^,i — 0,1,. . . ,m) , x( t^) — x^, (2.1)
r.i. nu^€R , x € r , where r^ is the dimension of the ith control vector. Each 
lower level control, u^, for i = l,...,m, is chosen to reduce as much as
8possible the scalar index
[i = K if(x (tf)) + J Li ;j = 0,1,...,
t ^
m)dt. (2 .2)
The coordinator’s control, u^, is chosen to reduce as much as possible 
the scalar index
Jo s,Kof(x(tf » + i’ Lo(X,Ui;i = 0,1» * * * >m)dt. (2.3)
The terminal time, t^, is fixed.
The information is assumed to be in the form of sampled data
acquisition, that is, measurements are taken at r discrete instances in
time lt^€[tQ,t^),i =0,1,...,r-l}. The controls will be functions of time
and the latest state measurement, i.e., u.=u.(t,x.) for t.^t<t. , , for9 l i J J J+l9
all i where x. -x(t.).
J J
The leader will calculate and announce u (t,x.) for t 6 [t.,t. .),
o K J j J+l'9
and j =0,1,...,r-l at the beginning of the game. This control is chosen 
to minimize the leader's performance index under the assumption that the 
followers will in turn be minimizing their respective performance indices 
subject to the announced leader's control, and subject to the requirement 
that the leader's control remains optimal for any game starting at t^, 
j =0,1,...,r-1. The controls are calculated based on the assumption that 
future measurements will be available at t^, k = j+1,...,r-l.
In contrast to the single controller case or even certain multi­
controller strategies, the Stackelberg controls including sampled data 
closed loop control do not in general satisfy the principle of optimality 
[8]. In this section we derive necessary conditions for sampled data
9equilibrium Stackelberg strategies whereby the principle of optimality is 
imposed at the sampling times t ^ , j = 0,1,...,r-l.
/V
Let the optimum costs to go at time t^  be denoted by (x(t^)>t ),
i = 0,1,... ,m. Imposing the principle of optimality we have 
* J+l
t^) =min{v^(xj+1,t^+1) + J Li(x,uk;k = 0,1,... ,m)dt} (2.4)
t. 
J
where
V?(x(tf),tf) = K lf(x(tf))J i = 0,1,...,m (2.5)
and where the minimization with respect to u^ in (2.4) is subject to the 
system constraint and to the minimization being performed by the other 
controllers according to the strategy outlined in the preceding paragraphs.
Note that the optimizations of the future periods are imbedded in the term
✓V
V^(xj_|_;L> tj+ i) • Also notice that at sample time t y  all controls from t^  
through t^ will, in principle, be calculated and that they are independent 
of any control action prior to t^  except for the effect of x ^ . So, by the 
nature of the problem formulation, the solution will satisfy the principle 
of optimality at the sampling times. This aspect of the sampled data 
formulation is analogous to the feedback formulations of [8], or the 
equilibrium formulation [7].
The variational method is applied to (2.1), (2.4), and (2.5), to 
obtain the necessary conditions. These conditions are an extension of those 
derived in [11]. The necessary conditions for the followers on [tj,t^^) 
for i * 1,...,m are
x = f(x,Ui; i = 0,1,. . . ,m) , x(t.)=x_. (2.6)
10
where
a>H!___L
Pi dx ’ Pi^ j+1 dx(t._^) (2.7)
0 =
dH. __ i
du. (2 .8)
Hi(x>pi,uk;k “ • >m) =Li(x,uk;k = 0,l,...,m) + p|f (x,uk;k «.0,1,... ,m).
(2.9)
The necessary conditions for the leader on [t^,t.+ p  are
dH' 2. *- o m a“v, (x(t \ t , )T-2 . 5l o  — 2____2 ± 1____2 + 1 S v w /  x- k v i+l;’ i + V
* X  3 { 1+ 1/ d x ( t _ )  k=lYk(tj+l) ^ ---- 2J+1 dxft .'i
m '
Yi " dp. 9 Yi ^ j ^  0j 1 1} • * * »m
^ ( j+i)Z (2.10)
(2 .11)
where Y^(t.) * lim_Yi(t) for Y defined on the (j-l)st interval [t. ,t.)+ t^tj 1 j - V  j
Y.(t.)=Y (t ) defined on the ith interval [t.,t. . ) . r j l j J L j J+1
dH __c
du (2 .12)
dH __o
du.' i
= 0, i = 1,...,m (2.13)
where
H0(x^ 5PiJYiJ3i; i= 1,2,... ,m,u ; j = 0,l,...,m) =LQ(x,ui; i = 0,l3...,m)
m dH. dH
+ ^ f (x,u.; i = 0,l,...,ni)+k21lY-(- (2.14)
' k
Equation (2.13) and the constraints appended under the summation 
sign in (2.14) are due to the leader taking into account the reactions of 
the lower level decisionmakers. The solution conditions on the (3^  are
11
implicit in equation (2.13).
2.3. The Linear Quadratic Case
Assume the system is linear
m
x = Ax + .2 b .u .i=0 l l (2.15)
x(t ) = x o o (2.16)
and the criteria quadratic
J. =fx'K
I 1 r mifX| + 2  J (x’Q ^  + jSoUjRi.jUjJdt. (2.17)
t = t- ” tf o
The necessary conditions for the lower level controllers for 
t 6 [tj,tj+ )^ and i = 1,... ,m are
dV~(x(t ),t )
p. = -Q.x - A'p., p!(t ,) = -- — T / --- — •L—  (2.18)i i *iv j+1' dx(t^+1) v '
ui = -R^ i Bi V
The necessary conditions for the leader are
m
X  = -Q x - a ' H  .^Q.Y,o 1=1 1 1
, t a< ( x ( t . +1) . t j+1) »  a2v*(x(tj+1) , t . +1)
( J+1> 3x < V i } i=l i( j+l) Sx(tj+1)2
(2 .20)
Y . = AY . - S .P.+S.X, Y.(t+ ) = 01 1 0,1 l l 5 a J
u = -R-1 B*\o 0,0 0
(2 .21)
(2.22)
where
12
S.l
A b .r ?1.i 1,1b !i
s. . = b .rT^.r . . rT1, b ' .
j , i  i  1 , 1  j , i  1 , 1
During each interval, the state will evolve according to
m
x = A x -  S S.p. - S X i=l iri o (2.23)
for t€[t^,t^+ )^ where x(t^) fs determined in the previous interval.
If the state measurements are made at r discrete instances in 
time, we are faced with an (r-fl)-point boundary value problem. At this 
stage, there are two alternate approaches we can take to the problem. The 
first and standard approach starts by assuming an explicit functional 
dependence of the costates on the state. This results in a set of coupled 
matrix Riccati equations which must be solved repeatedly at each sample 
time. A general algorithm for the efficient solution of these equations for 
each new set of boundary conditions will be outlined in the next section.
We will also consider an even more efficient approach utilizing invariant 
imbedding [13,14]. It is based on an assumption of the functional dependence 
of the state and costates on one another and of their explicit dependence 
on their respective boundary conditions. This result will be shown in 
detail.
2.4. Solution of the Linear Quadratic Problem
The first approach to dealing with the r-fl point boundary value 
problem starts by assuming that the costates depend on the states by affine 
functions. The affine dependence, rather than simply linear, is necessary 
so that the lower level decisionmakers will be able to calculate their
13
controls as functions of the leader’s announced control, i.e., their compu­
tations will be coupled to the leader's sequentially, not simultaneously.
Differential equations can be found for the coefficients of these 
functions and for the associated costs to go. If m is the number of con­
trollers, the problem can be reduced to that of solving m coupled matrix 
Riccati equations and m matrix Lyapunov equations at each sample time, all 
with boundary conditions at a common time. The same set of equations are 
resolved at each sample time with only a change in the boundary conditions.
A sampled data Nash formulation has been considered by Simaan and Cruz [9] 
and a computational technique for the solution of the resultant Riccati 
equations has also been obtained [10]. We have obtained a generalization 
of [10] in which the solutions of the Riccati equations are expressed in 
terms of a preliminary solution due to a specific set of boundary conditions 
and a correction term dependent on the actual boundary conditions. An 
algorithm is found for finding these correction terms requiring the solution 
of m uncoupled matrix Riccati equations, thus providing substantial improve­
ment over a brute force solution of the coupled equations.
With the first technique, we assume that the cost to go functions 
are of the form
V.11(t)-(|X 'E11K + e 11,x + q li)|t
V2(t) = x 'E2x + e^x+ q0) I2 t
in which case, the boundary conditions in (18) and (20) are
pi(tj+l) = (EliX + e li)lt.J + 1
and
14
X(tj+1) = (E2X + e2 - i£1E1.Y.)lt _
m
j + 1
As is conventionally done in solving the two point boundary 
value problems in optimal control, we assume a functional dependence of the 
costates on the state. An affine dependence is assumed due to the nature 
of the Stackelberg problem. Thus we assume
p . = K u x + g u
Y . = K~ .x -f gQ. i 3i &3r
= K2x + g2 .
(2.24)
By differentiation of these equations and from the equations of 
section 3, we find that the K matrices and g vectors must satisfy
m
Kii - -Qii - ■A 'KU  - KiiA + Kulj5isijKij+ s2K23’Ku (tj+i> = Eii(tj+i> 
. m
gli = "A Sli + Klffj£lSljglj + S 2g2^§ii(tj+1) "Pli^j+l^
. m m
K2 = -q2 -A'K2 -K2A + i£1Q U K31 + K2 i=lSliKli + K2S2K2
m
=P2(tj+P " iSlPli(tj+l)K3i(tj+l) 
m m
g2 = ’A 'g2 + K 2 iSi Sligli + K2S2g2 i=l^lig3i
m
:= p2(tj+l) 'i=lPli(tj+l)S3i
m
h i = AK3i - K3 .A - S2 t .K, . + S, ,K0 +K„. .2 s3 .K , li li li 2 3r j=l lj
m
g31 = As3i ' S2,li + SliS2 + K3i^ j=lSljglj + S2g2^
K31(tj) = o, g3i(t+ .)=o (2.25)
The coefficients in the cost to go functions must, in each
interval, satisfy the following equations
15
E, . = -E-. .A - A'E,. -Ni. li li li li
m
1 . 2
eii -^,eii + 2EiitjSlSijSlj + S 2S2^' 2 N li (2*26)
m
1 3
qli (j2lgijsij + g 2s2^pli ' 2 N li
Ell(tf) Klf’ eli(tf^  °s qll(tf) ° 
Eli(tj+1) = Eli(tj+1^’ ell(tj+l) = eli(tj+l^’ 
qli(tj:+ l) = q li(tj+l)
and the A, N ^ ,  j =1,2,3 are known in terms of the previous solution of
(2.25) . Equations of the same form are also satisfied by the coefficients E^j 
, and q^. The assumed dependence of the costates on the state, equation
(2.25) , results in a set of equations which, unlike the conventional optimal 
control problem, are themselves a two point boundary value problem. This
is a result of the leader appending the two point boundary value problem
which results from the followers' optimizations. So, we assume an explicit
dependence of the solution of the and the on the solution of the
Kli’ Sli’ and g^ in order to reduce these equations to a solvable single
point boundary value problem. Thus we assume
m
K„ . — F„ . 0K0 + F„. 1.K1.+ F„. ,3i 3i,2 2 j=l 3i,lj Ij 3i,4
m
g3i F3i,282 + j2lF3i,ljglj
Notice that the same coefficient matrices appear in both equations. This, 
it turns out, is sufficient to obtain the desired dependence. The differential 
equations that these coefficient matrices must satisfy are
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^3i)2 =AF3i>2 + F 3iJ2A '+ S U  + F3i,4S2 - F3ij2j5 l V 3 j , 2 ’F3i>2 ^ ) = 0
F3i)lk=AF3i,lk + F3i>lkA ' + F3i,4Sl k ' F3i,2 j-1 Q ljF3i, lk i?tk
m
F3i,lk _AF3i,lk + F3i,lkA + F3i,4Slk “ F3i,2 jSl Q lj F3i, lk " S2 , lk’ ± = k
u+,
F3i,lk(V  °
m  4-
3i,4 = AF3i,4+ F3i,4A ' + F3i,2^2 ” F3i,2 j=l % , 4 ' + F3i, Ij^lJ )F3i,4<tj > °
These equations are solved once only, and for a period of one sample 
interval. The solution is then used repeatedly during each sample interval, 
plugging into equations (2.25), converting (2.25) to a single point boundary 
value problem in which only the boundary condition changes between sample 
intervals.
Having done this, we are now at a point where the solution is 
expressed entirely in terms of equations of the following general form of 
the coupled matrix Riccati equations
J 1,J J J 2,j k=l j,k k j k=l j,k k
Kj(Ti+1); known j 1»• • • > X
(R)
where X is the number of coupled equations. These must be solved repeatedly 
with changes occuring only in the boundary conditions.
The final step for this technique of solving the sampled data 
problem is to derive an efficient technique for the repeated solution of 
coupled equations of the form (R). What follows is a generalization of [10] 
and [15].
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The approach taken is to express the solutions K^, corresponding
* £
to the actual boundary conditions, in terms of a solution R. which
corresponds to some other arbitrary, known boundary conditions. Equations 
for the correction terms are found and a sequence of steps leads to a 
solution which requires i uncoupled matrix Riccati equations to be solved 
each time and some auxilary equations must be solved once only and over a 
period equal to the sample interval. The details follow.
Define
then
Differentiating, we find
JL
where
If we define the term
/-Ii = 1 2J  J - )
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differentiation yields
KX-l J - L i -1 , J - l j -1
i-1 i-lj-l . i-1X-l > l Tr4-l . „i-l= A +, V - V <  + K  A  D . * K" ‘ +Q71,J J J 2 , j  k=l j ,k 1c j k=l j,k k
where
Kj‘V k+1) = [Zj (tk+i ) ] ' ^ ( t k+1) j = 1, ..
,X-1 J
1,J lj
x-i _ j
j,k "Gj,k
DX“?; = +G^ v J5k
q X " L  "  i  J J
So, the solution of the zf equations can be obtained once the K^”1 equations 
are solved. However, the solutions for the original equations, are
expressed in terms the (zf) 1j=l,...,i and, given ( z f ) " 1, the remainingj JO
J - l(L — 1 0 — 1 «_ j(Z.) for j=l,...,X-l are known in terms of (Z„) and the K. , J Jo j
j=l,...9&-l. For each i, i=l,...,i, the term (Z^)  ^ satisfies
<z i < v i ) ) ' 1 " [Ki ( t j + i ) - ^ ( t j + i >1
Thus, we have the , j=l,...,X known in terms of (zf)"1 and the 
j=l,. .., i-1. The equations in K”f  ^are of the same form as the equations 
in Kj and so the technique is applied again and is done recursively until 
we reach K-^ . Notice that at level i of the recursion only one equation, in
rj&-l
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• -t
(Z^) , need be integrated.
In summary, once the preliminary solutions, are found, the
desired solutions are obtained as follows;
solve for (Z^) ^
1 * 1  1-1 
Ki = Ri + ( V
1
solve for (Z^)  ^
, 2.-1 1, J .-1
(Zi) k1(z2)
2 *2 2 - 1
k2 = V ( z2)
2 *2 2 - 1
3 -1solve for (Z^) 
3-1 2 3-1
(zp = 4 (Z3}
3-1 2 3 - 1(z p 1 -  k2 (z 3)
3 "3 , . 3.-1K3 =K3+(Z3)
3 *3 3 - 1
*2 ~ * i  + <Z2>
3 a3 3-1
h = K I + <ZP
£ _i.
solve for (Z^)
(Zj)‘1 =Kj'1(Z^)‘1
i r f - r f + t f V 1J J J
j=l,...,4-1 
J ~ 1 > • • • j 4
So, in this first approach, the sampled data Stackelberg problem 
is reduced to the solution of a set of i coupled matrix Riccati equations, 
each of dimension n, which must be solved at each sample time with only a 
change in the boundary conditions. The solution of these equations for
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any boundary condition is then found to be expressible in terms of the 
solution of an auxiliary problem. The needed correction terms require the 
solution of i uncoupled matrix Riccati equations of dimension n, at each 
sample time. Considerable savings in computation will accrue if there are 
a large number of samples, which is typically the case.
2.4.1. The Second Approach; Invariant Imbedding
The ultimate goal when deriving the solution technique is to 
minimize the amount of computations required by taking advantage of the 
fact that the equations to be solved are the same in each sample interval 
and only the boundary conditions change.
The derivations performed in the remainder of this section will 
proceed as outlined below. First we define more compact notation, grouping 
the state and costates according to their boundary conditions. We then 
assume an explicit functional dependence of the costates on the state and 
on the costates' boundary conditions. Due to this assumption, the solutions 
of the resultant equations are independent of the changing costates1 
boundary conditions and it is because of this independence that we are able 
to obtain the computational savings. The cost to go equations are derived 
since they are needed to generate the appropriate boundary conditions to 
plug into the solution functions. A functional dependence of the costs to 
go on their boundary conditions is also assumed and finally the boundary 
conditions for each interval are established in terms of those in the 
adjacent interval. The details of the derivation follow.
Rather than making the standard assumption of a functional 
dependence of the costates on the state alone as in the first approach, we
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will make a different assumption. Notice that on the interval [t..t.(1).
L J J+l'
the costates p^, Vi, equations (2.18) and \, equation (2.20), have 
boundary conditions at t ^  The costates Vi, equations (2.21) and the 
state x, equation (2.23), have boundary conditions at t ^ . For convenience 
of notation, let us group the state and costate vectors according to 
boundary conditions as follows
y! = X
y2 - < r; ; Y2 i ••• ; Y;>‘
d_
dt
y3 i (A ' : p i  : p2 : * I
20) (2 .21) and (2.23) can
~y f H a i i 0 A13
y2 = 0 A22 A23
A3l A32 A33
y2
(2.27)
where the A ^  of (2.27) are appropriate concatenation of the Q, A and S
matrices of (2.18), (2.20), (2.21) and (2.23). In each interval
the vectors y^ and y^ have boundary conditions at t^  and the vector y^ has
boundary conditions at t^_^.
y2 ( d ) = o (2.28)
y3(tj+l> =
f
i
*0
 
l 
7^
J 
l
! bV1 m b2V .
0 _ 2 1 . V
by. i=l -s 2 i
1 Syl
j. —
• 3v'| # 1
P 3yim •
bV*m
by
yl
_ _
17j+1
(2.29)
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where y2(tt) =y2(tj) 
lim y3(t) for y (t)
defined on the interval ft.,t..,) and y0(t,,n) =J J+l 3V j+ly
defined on the interval ft.,t. _).
J J+1
It is in the next step where we deviate from the standard 
approach. We will make assumptions of the functional dependence of the 
costates on the state and on the costates1 boundary conditions. In so doing 
we will be able to solve for these functions independent of the costates1 
boundary conditions.
For t€Ft.,t.11) assume'*'J J+l
y2 (t) = F l(t)y1(t) + F 2(t)y2(tj) + F 3(t)y3(tj+1) (2.30)
and
y3(t) ssG1(t)y1(t) + G2(t)y2(t) + G3(t)y3(t ) . (2.31)
By differentiation of (2.30) and (2.31) and by substitution of (2.27), we 
find^
G1 = a 3 1  + a 33G1 -' G1A 11 " G1A13G1 ' G2A23G1’ Gl(V d  ■ 0
d2 - A32 + a 33g2 -‘ G1A13G2 " G2A22 “ G2A23G2J G2 0
S = (a 33 - g la 13 - G2A23)G3, ^3 (tj_j_1) = I
h = (a 22 + a 23g2)F1 ‘ F1(A11 + A 13G1) " F1A13G2F1 + A 23GV  Fl(tj) = °
F2 = A22F2 + A23G2F2 " F1A 13G2F2’
"3 = (a £2 + a 23g2 “ F1A 13G2^F3 + A23G3 " F1A 13G3* v v = 0.
(2.32)
(2.33)
(2.34)
(2.35)
(2.36)
(2.37)
The dependence of y3(t) on y2(t) instead of y (t.) results in simplified 
computations. 3
'All matrices are evaluated at time t unless indicated otherwise.
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Since y*(t.)=0 and by substituting (2.30) into (2.31) we have
^  J
y2(t) = F 1(t)y1(t) + F 3(t)y3(tj+1) (2.38)
y3(t) = G 1(t)y1(t) + G 3(t)y3(tj+1) (2.39)
where = G1 + G ^  and G^ = G^ + G ^ .
For t€[t.,t._) assume"*" J J+l'
yl<t) = H 1(t)y1(tj) + H 3(t)y3(t x) (2.40)
by differentiation of (2.40) and substitution of (2.27) and (2.39) we find
\  = (A 11 + A13V H 1> W =I (2.41)
H 3 = (A11+ A 13G1)H3 + A 13G3, H3(tj) =0. (2.42)
If the system (2.15) and the criteria functions (2.17) are time invariant and
if the sampling rate is constant, that is if (t^+  ^- t ) = T = constant for all
j, the equations (2.32) through (2.37), (2.41) and (2.42) will be the same
for each interval. Then, since their boundary conditions are invariant,
these equations will have to be solved only once and the same solution will
be valid for every interval [t.,t ,), j = 0,1,...,r-1.J J-*-
2.4.2, Boundary Conditions and Cost To Go Equations
The boundary conditions for the costate equations on the jth 
interval are known in terms of the costs to go at the end of the
interval, (2.7) and (2.10). Therefore, for the purpose of obtaining the 
costates' boundary conditions, we must first derive the cost to go equations. 
First, substituting (2.19) and (2.22) for the controls and with the form of
Because (2.30) and (2.31) reduce to (2.38) and (2.39), the dependence of 
y-^ (t) on need not be assumed.
1
24
the solution for y3 as in (2.39), recalling that y3 *(\' I I ... I p^) ', 
the integrands of the criterion functions can be written
1 m 1Li = 2{x,Qix + . 50u ,.Ri .u}=I {yiQly1+ y ^ iy3}
and for t 6 [ t , t >
Li = 2 y^i^ilyl + y3<'tj+l) '^i2y3(tj+l^ + y l \ 3 y3('tj+l) (2-43)
where all variables are evaluated at time t unless indicated otherwise, and 
where
s . ,  = Q. + G| S.G,11 1 1 1 1
s . 0 = G's.Go12 3 l 3
S40 =GiS.G0 i3 1 l 3
and
s.  i1 -
10
il
S.lm
Due to the assumed explicit dependence of the costates, y^(t) on
their boundary conditions in each interval, we must make a similar assumption
for the form of the cost to go equations so that they will also be independent
of the changing boundary conditions. That is, for the interval t (ft->t. .)J J+l
we define the function
Vi<yi<t),t) = | ^ l < t>'Cu (t)y1(t)+ y3(tj:+1)'Ci2(t)y3(tj:+1)}
+ y 1 ( t ) , c i 3 ( t ) y 3 ( t j+1 ) • (2.44)
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When evaluated at t., with the controls in the interval [t.,t ) being theJ j £
optimal controls defined according to (2.4), this function is then the 
optimum cost to go, denoted V*(y-, (t. ) , t . ) . By (2.44) we see that on the 
interval ft.,t ^), the cost to go is not only quadratic in y^, but also 
has a quadratic term in y^(tj_^) anc* a cross term in y^(t) and ^S^j-fl^* 
From the relationship between the costs to go (2.44) and the 
integrands of the criteria functions (2.43), the differential equations of 
the coefficient matrices in (2.44) are found to be
C.. = “S.. - C . x .  - A' c.. ll il ll 11 11 ll
Ci2 ~Si2 ' 2A13Ci3
Ci3 "Si3 ' CilA13 " A llCi3
(2.45)
(2.46)
(2.47)
where A u  - (Au  + and A ^
2.4.3. Boundary Conditions
The boundary conditions for the last interval, that is, at the 
terminal time, tr, areS f  »
C. - (tA = K. . ilv if
Ci2(tf) °
ci3 (tf) 0 .
(2.48)
We must also establish appropriate boundary conditions for the remaining 
intervals. The costs to go must be continuous and therefore
V • (y-, (t. ) , t. ) = V (y (tl") , tl") . 
1 w  1 j j iw l j/ j/ (2.49)
Since the cost to go equations are integrated backwards, we are trying to
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establish the Cl, (t.) in terms of the C., (t.) at each j, for each i, and ik j ik j
for all k, k = 1,2,3.
Let us choose
Ci2< V = °
Ci3(tj) = °
(2.50)
(2.51)
for all j and for all i. So now we must simply find C.^(t ) in terms of the 
C±k(t+ ) for k = l,2, and 3.
Due to their interrelatedness, we must simultaneously consider
solving for the boundary conditions y~(t.) from (2.18), (2.20) and (2.44)J
j .
and solving for the C.-,(t.) in terms of the C., (t.), k = 1,2,3, from (2.49).n  J ik J
To minimize the required computations, it is advantageous if 
y^(t) is broken up
y3 "
—  — -- —
1 X
y3 A"* “ "* = p l2 •
y 3_ •
_ Pm _
(2.52)
The derivation of the boundary conditions for the jth interval 
[tj’tj-fl) Procee<^s as follows. From (2.29), (2.44), (2.50) and (2.51)
y ^ L + F  =
'XI
'21
'ml
(2.53)
'j+1
and
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^ ^ j + P  tC01yl " C(Fiyl + F 3y3 ^
'j+1 (2.54)
■[C0iyi-C < V l  + F3 ^  + F3y3)]
j+1
— 1 2  where C = [Cj^ ! 1 ... I C^] and where F^ is broken up into = [F^ I F^]
1 2  1 2  with F^ and F^ having dimensions which correspond to y^ and y^. By substi­
tuting (2.53) into (2.54), equation (2.54) becomes
y3 ^ j + P  C^01yl " C('Flyl + F3y3 + F3C,yl^
tj+l
so (2.55)
y3(tj:+ 1)=[(I + C F31)-1(C01-C(F1 + F2c ,))y1]l
Combining (2.53) and (2.55) defines D.
J * *L
y3(tJ:+ i ) = V i yi(tj+i)
j+1
(2.56)
where
Dj+1
.1,-1(I + CF^> i(C01 - C(F1+F^C1))
c 1
'j+1
(2.57)
By breaking up y^ as in (2.52) we need only invert a matrix of dimension n, 
the system dimension, to obtain D _. Otherwise we would have had to invert
j+1
a matrix of dimension n(m+l).
To find the C_^(t_._^) we also need a relationship between >^3 
and y1(tj). That is, from (2.40) and (2.56) we can find
y3(tj+l> = Ejyl(tj) (2‘58)
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where
(2.59)
So, from (2.44), (2.49), (2.50), (2.51) and (2.58)
(2.60)
We now have all of the required boundary conditions. The cost to go boundary 
conditions are (2.48), (2.50), (2.51) and (2.60) and the costate boundary 
conditions are (2.56) or (2.58).
2.4.4. Solution of the Cost to Go Equations
but rather we only need the value at the initial boundary, i.e., we only
each interval and only the boundary conditions change. In order to avoid 
resolving these equations in each interval, we will assume a functional 
dependence of the cost to go matrices on their boundary conditions, similar 
to the technique used on the costates. Since the cost to go equations are 
linear, we can find such a functional dependence. It will be independent 
of the changing boundary conditions and can therefore be presolved. The 
solution of the function will be valid for each interval.
For notational convenience, we will "stack” the columns of the cost
to go matrices so that the matrix equations (2.45) through (2.47) can be
written as vector equations. Let c ^  be the vector corresponding to the
matrix C., . Define c. as lk i
need to solve for the C^(t^) in terms of the C
The cost to go equations, (2.45) through (2.47), are the same for
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c .1
A (2.61)
Then (2.45) through (2.47) can be rewritten as
c. = A.c. + b. (2.62)i i i i
where the matrix A. and the vector b. are known from the coefficientl i
matrices of (2.45) through (2.47). We can now solve for the functional
dependence of the solution of (2.62) in the jth interval on the boundary
condition c^(t ^). Actually, since ci2(tj+d 0 and Si3(tj:+1) = 0 ’ We
need only assume dependence of the solution on c ^ ( tj+l)9 l*e*s for
t 6 [ t ., t . , ) assume J J+l
c.(t) = Mi(t)cil(t^+ 1) + d i(t). (2.63)
From (2.62) and (2.63) it follows that
t ^
M. * A.M. ,l l l5
I
tj+l)
0
= A . d . +i l bi’
(2.64)
(2.65)
where the dimension of the identity matrix in M(t )^ is the same as the
dimension of c .,.ll
If the system is time invariant and if the sampling rate is
constant then (2.64) and (2.65) need be solved only once over one sampling
+  - i-interval. In fact, only the value of M.(t.) and d.(t.) need be stored since1 J l J
we only need c (t ) in terms of c.,(tT n). That is 
i J ll j+I
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c.(t+) = M.(t+ )c (t“ .) + d.(t+)
i y  3- J il J + l i J (2 . 66)
where M.(t.) and d„(t.) are the same for all i.i v y  i v y
Due to the relationship (2.63), we will not have to solve the 
cost to go equations (2.45) through (2.47) repeatedly for each sample 
interval but need only plug into (2.66).
2.4.5. Summary of Algorithm
We will now summarize the required calculations in the following 
flow chart. The major steps and reference to the related equations are 
given in the order in which they must be computed.
All integrations are performed over only one sample interval if 
the system is time invariant.
Going backwards from j =r-l to j = 1, beginning with the known
cil.(tf) ^roTn (2*48), the following calculations must be done for each j in 
order to obtain the boundary conditions for each interval.
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until we have
2.4.6. Implementation
The controls can now be implemented forward in time. They are 
found by (2.19), (2.22), the definitions of y~, i.e., y =(X' I pJ 1 ... ’. p')1,
-9 J • JL • • III
and y^-x, and the evolution of y3(t) in each interval, t £ [t^ , t..+ )^ given
by
where
y3(t) = P(t)yi(t^) (2.67)
P(t) = [G1(t)(H1(t)+H3(t)E ) + G  (t)E.] (2.68)*3 j
which is derived from (2.39), (2.40) and (2.58).
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If P(t) is broken up as
P(t)
pQ (t)
pt(t)
p (t)m
where each block P^(t) is n by n, then the ith control during the jth 
interval is
^(t) -r 7}b !p .(t)x(t.). n  1 ' v y
As outlined above, there are a number of equations to be 
integrated, some of which are of large dimension. These integrations, how­
ever, are done once only and are performed over a period equal to the 
length of only one sample interval. Thus, as the number of samples taken 
increases, the computational burden is reduced. Computationally the only 
limiting factor which prohibits us from allowing the length of the sample 
intervals to become arbitrarily small is the corresponding increase in the 
number of matrix inversions which must be performed at the sampling times 
in order to generate the required boundary conditions for each interval. 
That is, as the period of integration becomes smaller, these matrix inver­
sions will tend to become the dominant computational burden. The matrix 
inversions present another difficulty since, in general, we are unable to 
guarantee their existence.
2.4.7. Comparison of Techniques
The first technique discussed at the beginning of this section is 
a method for converting the problem of repeatedly solving m coupled matrix
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Riccati equations to that of solving m uncoupled matrix Riccati equations 
providing significant computational savings. These equations, however, 
must still be solved repeatedly for each sample interval with only a change 
in the boundary conditions.
The second approach requires a set of linear and Riccati equations 
to be solved once only over a horizon which is the length of only one sample 
interval. The computational advantage of this second technique is due to 
the fact that the integrations are performed over only one sample interval 
which is, in general, considerable shorter than the time horizon of the 
original problem.
The second approach has an advantage over the first approach due 
to the fact that the equations which are to be solved in the second 
technique are solved only once for a period equal to one sample interval 
while the equations to be solved in the first technique must be solved 
repeatedly during each sample interval. However, for a sufficiently small 
sample interval it has been observed that the matrix inversions needed to 
generate the boundary conditions in the second technique can become a 
dominant factor. Therefore, the advantage shifts to the first technique for 
the case of decreasing sample interval.
2.5. Conclusions
In this chapter, a sampled data equilibrium Stackelberg strategy 
has been considered. The advantages of the formulation can be seen by 
considering certain characteristics of the continuous time Stackelberg 
problem. The linear quadratic, continuous time, closed loop Stackelberg
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problem results in a solution, if it exists, in which the controls are non­
linear functions of the state. Furthermore, the Stackelberg solution for 
general dynamic games does not, in general, satisfy the principle of 
optimality. The principle of optimality can be imposed for discrete time 
games but the procedure for doing this for general continuous time games 
has not been established.
The sampled data equilibrium Stackelberg solution results in 
linear control laws for the linear quadratic case. The advantage of linear 
control laws is that they are quite simple to implement.
In deriving the sampled data equilibrium Stackelberg solution we 
have been able to obtain considerable computational savings. That is, 
rather than performing integrations over the entire time horizon of the 
original problem, we are able to imbed the subproblems of each sample 
interval into a more general formulation, the solution of which requires 
integrations over a period equal to the length of only one sample interval. 
The computational technique, an application of invariant imbedding developed 
for the particular case of a Stackelberg strategy and the type of boundary 
conditions peculiar to it, is quite useful for many problems, in particular 
for a variety of sampled data formulations.
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CHAPTER 3
ON THE EXISTENCE OF STABILIZING SOLUTIONS 
FOR THE STACKELBERG STRATEGY
3.1. Introduction
In the previous chapter we developed an effective method for the 
coordination of the decentralized control of a large system by imposing a 
form of the Stackelberg strategy and exploiting certain characteristics of 
the strategy. The Stackelberg strategy, as considered in Chapter 2, is one of 
many forms in which it might arise. Generally it is of interest either as a 
control strategy to be imposed on a given problem, such as for coordination 
purposes, or it may arise naturally wherever a precedence relationship exists 
among the controllers.
While prescriptive approaches to the design of controllers which 
satisfy the Stackelberg strategy have been developed for many forms of the 
strategy, little is known about the existence of such control laws or if the 
system under their control will be stabilized. In this chapter, we will 
address the problem of the existence of stabilizing solutions for controller, 
which are obtained according to a Stackelberg strategy.
In order to consider a simple form of the Stackelberg strategy we 
will examine the problem of a linear system being controlled by two controllers 
where the control laws are constrained to be in the form of linear, time- 
invariant state feedback. The cost functions are assumed to be defined over 
an infinite horizon. It is known [6] that in general there is no optimal 
linear control law for the leader so we consider the problem in which the 
leader’s cost function is modified in order to average out the dependence of 
the solution on the initial condition. This formulation is well posed with
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respect to linear solutions. The necessary conditions for this problem have 
been derived in [6].
Our interest in the problem is in finding out if there exists a 
stabilizing solution and if so, presenting conditions under which a stabi­
lizing solution can be guaranteed. This particular form of the Stackelberg 
strategy, i.e., linear state feedback, is considered because it allows us to 
use concepts from linear systems theory in approaching the problem.
In Section 3.2 we will introduce the concepts needed to establish 
the main result which is presented in Section 3.3.
3.2. Background
It will be assumed throughout that we are dealing with a linear 
time invariant system and linear time invariant control laws.
3.2.1. Controllable subspaces
For the multi-controller case, the individual controllable sub­
spaces are not invariant with respect to feedback. For example, for the two 
controller case
< a+b1f1 | e2> * <a |b2>
in general, where B2 = (R(B2) and where
( A13) = 3 “f  A3 +  • • • +  ^ 3
where N is the dimension of the system and 3 = (R(B). So the controllable sub­
space of one controller can be altered by feedback by another controller.
The jointly controllable subspace
<A|31 > + < a |32>
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say, is invariant with respect to feedback. This is true for any number of 
controllers.
For the two DM case we can denote
R.(F.) = < A + B  F |g.) itj, i=l ,2 
and the following is readily verified.
Lemma 3.1: For i=l,2 the subspace R_^  depends on F , j^i, and does not depend
on F. .l
Thus the notation R^CF^.), j^i is justified.
If we define EL to denote the space perpendicular to R. then, for 
given F^ and F^;
R^(Fj) is the smallest (A+B^ .F^ .)-invariant subspace containing 
<R(B±), i^j , i=l,2.
Rj (F^) is the largest (A-HEhF^) f-invariant subspace contained in 
?KB_!), i^j , i=l,2, where 72(A) = null space of A.
The following subspace definitions will be useful. The system triple 
(AjB^jB^) uniquely determines the subspaces defined as follows;
R? : largest subspace ^ such that ^ C r _(f ,^) for all F., j^i.
The R* can be thought of as the greatest lower bound (in the sense of sub­
space inclusion) for the set of subspaces R.(F.) over all F.. The definition1 J J
of these subspaces is invariant with respect to feedback, i.e., they are the 
same whether we consider the system (AjB^jB^) or ((A+B^F^+B^^ ,B^ ,B2> for 
any F ^ F ^
3.2.2. Criterion Subspaces
For the quadratic criterion function
oo m
J. = lH f (x'Q.x+ 1  u!R..u,)dt 1 tQ i 1=1 J iJ 1
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and the system
m
x = Ax + EB.u. x (t ) = x j=l 3 J o o
u. = F.x. 1 l
the criterion subspace is defined
m
where
3. (F . ; j=l, . . . ,m) = < A* I C !> + E <A'|3.'.> J i j=l 1 ij
_ A mA = (A + Z B.F.)
i=l i i
c !  = (R(c’ )
3!. = <r(f !r ./2.)
3 IJ
c!c. = Q. > 0, R.. > 0, R..> 0 i, j = 1, .. .,m.l l l ij ii
If x^Ep^, x^^O, then > 0 (possibly infinite). We say that the subspace
P . is observable through the criterion function J..i
The criterion subspaces have the following property.
Lemma 3.2:
m n m
for all F_. and where p^ is the open loopP^ with F = 0, j=l,...,m.
The proof of this follows in a straightforward way from Theorem 3.6
of [22].
Lemma 3.2 tells us that observability is preserved under feedback. 
Another direct consequence of Theorem 3.6 of [22] is the following: 
Lemma 3.3: If for some i, the R , j=l,...,m are all positive-definite,
R _ > 0, and the system is detectable through , i.e., the open loop
when all feedback gains equal zero, then the system will remain detectable
through Jk(F^.; j=l,...,m) for all F^ .
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If we define jjk to be the subspace perpendicular to $ . then, for 
nd F , in the two controller case, for R. . =0, j^i,
z ij
^(OjF^) is the smallest (A+B^F^)'-invariant subspace containing
<R(C|)
and
^ 2 ^ 1 ’^  as t i^e ^ar§est: (A+B F )-invariant subspace contained in
f i (  c 2) .
The subspaces andJ^OjF^) can be defined similarly.
At this point, we need to be familiar with the following concepts 
of (A,B)-invariant subspaces [22].
A subspace J  is (A,B)-invariant if and only if there exists an F
such that
(A + BF) J C  J.
If S is a set of subspaces then the supremal subspace of* of the set S is 
defined as the subspace J such that of E S and for every J e S, if the
supremal subspace exists, it is unique.
For some subspace Q, the set of all (A,B)-invariant subspaces
contained in Q always has a supremal element. With this background we can 
make the following observation.
Lemma 3.4: There exists unique JF* and y “ such that
i=l,2.
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Corresponding to these supremal are infimal subspaces ^ 7 for
which
<^ i C^ i ^ l ,F2  ^ f°r a11 F1 and F2*
A particular case that will be of interest is as follows:
If, say, 0 (positive-definite) then
h (Fl’F2) C ^1(0>F2) C h (° ’0) E $ V
3.3. Existence of Stabilizing Stackelberg Solution
We consider the following problem. For the system
x  = Ax +  B^u^ +  B^u^ 
and linear control laws
x(t ) = x o o
u. = F.x i = 1,2 l i
decision maker i wants to choose F. to minimize the criterion functioni
l 00 z
J . =  '2 I (xT Q .x + £ u!R. .u . )dt i 1 1 j=l 3 1
where
c ! c .  = Q. , R. . >  0 i  = 1 , 2 , R. . > 0  j ^ ii l l  n  * ’ ij J
and where they act according to the Stackelberg strategy with as the
leader [6].
It is known in general there is no optimal linear control law for
the leader so we consider the problem in which the leader's cost function
is modified in order to average out the dependence of the solution on the
initial conditions x , i.e., we defineo
Jn = E{J }
1 1
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with
E{x } = 0 and E{x x ’} = X >0. o o o o
The necessary conditions for this problem were derived in [6]. 
conditions for the infinite horizon problem are as follows
The
F2 = -R22B2K2 ’  K2 "  M2
a 'k 2 + k 2a + K2S22K2 + F1R21F1 + Q2 = 0
a 'm + M A + V l 2K2 + FiRllFl + t-1
O' = 0
N2A + M 2 S22M1N1 N1M1S22 + S12M2N1 + N1M1S12 °
N A + AN- + X = 0 1 1 o
R21F1N2 + RllFlNl - Bh M2N2 + MlNl> “ 0
where the last equation is solved for F^.
We would like to answer the question: Under what conditions can
we guanratee that there will exist a solution (F*,F*) such that the resultant 
system
x = (A+B F* + B2F*)x
is asymptotically stable?
For a given F , the follower is faced with a conventional optimi­
zation for which it is known [23] that if the triple (C^, A+B^F^jB^) is 
stabilizable and detectable, then there will exist a unique optimal F“ and 
that the system matrix (A+B^F^+B^F*) will be stable. So, we ask under what
*juconditions does there exist an optimal F^ and if it exists, under what 
conditions will it be chosen such that (C^,A+B^F*,B2) will be stabilizable
and detectable?
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Theorem 3.1: Existence of stabilizing solution.
We assume that the system is jointly controllable
R1(°) + r2(0) = rn
and we assume that R ^ ^ O  the leader has a positive definite penalty on the 
follower’s control action. If 
i) The system is observable through £ 
and
ii) C r*1
then there exists an optimal F* and an optimal F* 
loop system
and the resultant closed
(A+B*F*+B*F*)
will be asymptotically stable.
Before proving Theorem 3.1, some preliminary results are needed. 
After DM*" applies feedback, the controllable subspaces are R^(0) 
and R2(Fi). We have assumed joint controllability so
Rl(0) + W  = rN*
Note that (A+B^F^)R2(F^)C R^(F^), i.e., R2(F^) is (A+B^F^)-invariant. 
Define the factor space
x = rn/r2(f1).
This space is isomorphic to R^(F^) where R^(F^) is defined as follows:
If R (F ,F ) = R (F ) H r (F ) then let R.(F.) be any subspace such that o 1 z I z z 1 1 1
R±(F ) = Ro(F1,F2)©Ri(F.) j*i.
Since X is isomorphic to R^(F^), i.e.,
rn /r2(f1) * V V
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let
l± = ^ 1+ R 2)/R2’ 3l = <R(Bi)
and let be the map induced by A on X. Then,
Lemma 3.5:
<a iA >  =
Proof: Proposition 1.2 of [22],
Now, corresponding to R (F ) and R2(F ) there is a basis such 
that the matrix (A+B^F^) will be of the form
*11
21 A22
where
22 ■ (A+Bi V l R
A11P ■ p<A + B i V
where P is the canonical projection,
P : R -> X.
So from Lemma 3.5 we see that the eigenvalues of A can be placed 
arbitrarily by Dm \
In the sequel, when referring to the system, we mean (C2,A+B F ,B2> 
unless noted otherwise.
+ -We will use the notation x (A) and x(A) defined as follows:
X (A) is the space spanned by the eigenvectors corresponding to the unstable 
eigenvalues.
X (A) is the space spanned by the eigenvectors corresponding to the stable 
eigenvectors.
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The following lemmas will also be needed.
Consider the set
h  : < k }
where f2(f ) represents the reaction of decision maker two to the controls 
of decision maker one. That is, f2(F^) t*ie implicit mapping defined by 
the optimization performed by decision maker two.
Lemma 3.6: The mapping = i^^l^ is continuous over the set of F^ for which
the triple
(C2,(A+B1F1),B2) 
is stabilizable and detectable,
Proof: The mapping = is defined implicitly by the solution for
of the Riccati equation
o = (a + b1f1),k 2 + k 2(a + b1f1) - k 2b 2r“2b2k 2 + q2 + f:[r 21f1
and
f2 = - R ^ b ’k 2 .
The partial derivative of the Riccati equation with respect to its solution 
K2 is
(I® a ') + (A1 ® I)
where ® is the Kronecker product (i.e., A ® B =  (a_^B)) and where 
A = (A+B1F1+B2F2).
If F^ is such that the system is stabilizable and detectable then 
A will be stable. A characteristic of Kronecker products is that if A is
stable then so is
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(I®A') + (A? S> I)
and since it has no eigenvalues A = 0, it is nonsingular.
By the Implicit Function Theorem, if a function f(x,y) is dif­
ferentiable with respect to x and y and if
where
0 = f(x,y)
f : X x X
then there exists a neighborhood N of y in ^  over which a continuous 
differentiable (implicit) function g(y) is defined such that
0 = f (g(y) ,y), ye N
if
—9x - 1 x
is nonsingular.
Therefore the function ~F2 = f^CF^) as cont:anilous (an<^  differentiable) over the 
set of F^ for which the system is stabilizable and detectable.
The set is a subset of
= {F | J1(F1,F2) < k; for any F ^
and
Lemma 3.7: The set is a subset of 3^ for a given k, a sufficiently
large f and a sufficiently small e > 0 where
3^ : {F^|llFjH < f; Re{A(A)> < -e, e>0, for any F^}.
Note that 3^ is closed and bounded.
Proof: For our case where we have R ^  > ^ and ^12 > ^’ •'-,ennna 3.7 follows from
Lemma 3.8 which we will prove in detail. (Lemma 3.8 is in a more convenient 
form to work with.)
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Lemma 3.8: For
x = Ax + Bu
oo
J = */2 E {/ (x'Qx+u?Ru)dt}
X° to
R >0, E{x } = 0, E{x x’} = I o o o
C’C = Q> 0
(C,A); observable
(A,B); stabilizable
= {F|J(F)<k}
3^ = {FIII F f| < f; (Re (A (A+BF) ) < -e}.J3
For a given k, there exists a sufficiently large f<°° and a sufficiently 
small e> 0 such that
A similar result for the case of Q > 0  has been obtained in [25]
for output feedback.
Proof of Lemma 3.8: For any F for which J(F) is finite the system will be
stabilized and the cost will be
J(F) = tr(L)
where L satisfies
LA + A'L + Q + F'RF = 0 (3.1)
where A= (A+BF). A = (A+BF).
By taking the norm of equation (3.1), we establish that implies that
IlFll < f
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where
where
a = min{|[ F'RF 11} > 0 
F
IlFll = 1
b = 2f-IIB n 
c = 2f-II All + ||Q | .
(3.2)
It remains to show that Fe5 ^  implies the existence of an e > 0  such that
<Re(A(A+BF)) < -e.
Define
Q = Q + F'RF
and m-1
Q(F) = E (A+BF) 
i=0
lTQ(A+BF)1.
Notice that
(RCA1 C ’ ) = (RCA1 ? C? CA1)
so <R« A ’ | C1 )) = <R(Q(F) )
and Q(F) > 0.
—i T -iIf we pre- and post-multiply equation (3.1) by A and A respectively, and 
sum these equations over i=0,1,...,m-l, we have
LA + A'L + Q = 0
where _ A m-1 . f
L = E A LA . 
i=0
Since Q>0, the set IlFll < f  is closed and bounded and since the
eigenvalues of a matrix depend continuously on the elements of the matrix,
there exists a q .m m
0 < qm - = min min(A.(Q)). 
IIFII < F 1 1
Notice also that
m
I L I < E A. (L) = tr(L) i=l i
for any L = L f >
L = L' > 0
where
I L I = sup I Lx 1 = A (L) . i i ma.x 1 xl =1
Thus
llLll<J(F) = k
for
Fed.A
and
I LII < k ' Z  (llAll +IIBII -f)21 = l 
i=0
If
then
(Re{ A (A) } < -e.
A sufficient condition for
L < h is that
L I <
A . (Q) m m  ^
2e
therefore for FG we have A
<Re{ A(A + BF) } < -e
for e such that
0 < e <
q •m m
2£ *
So, for f as in (3.2) and e from (3.3) we have
<iii
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First, we show that, under the conditions ©f the theorem,' there 
exists a leader's control that will make the system stabilizable for the 
follower and that in order for to be finite the leader must choose F^ such 
that the follower will stabilize the system.
Second, we show that there exists a leader's control such that the 
system is detectable by the follower and that for such an F , the follower will 
stabilize the system.
The first two parts will establish that there exists an F^ such that 
and are finite and we establish that the control gains considered by DM^ 
can be restricted to a set for which the follower will then be faced with a 
stabilizable and detectable problem. In the third part we show that the 
leader's optimization can be considered to be over a closed, bounded set on 
which the follower's control depends continuously on the leader's control and 
so the leader's cost function will be continuous in F^ over this set. These 
conditions are sufficient to establish the desired results.
Part 1
By Lemma 3.5 we know that there exists an F^ such that the system 
is stabilizable by the follower. Now we show that the leader must make the 
system stabilizable to have a finite .
We can express as
J = E{lim(x'V(t)x )}1 t—^co 0 0
V(t) = /teS^ ( C ^  + F ^  + F^F^e^ds
The proof of Theorem 3.1 will be done in three parts.
where
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with A= and, without loss of generality, assume Rj^= 1 and
R = ^  ^ unsta^^ -e let * be an eigenvalue with Re(u)^0 and let x be
the corresponding eigenvector.
Then
x'Vx = /te2sRe(u)(|Cx|2 + |F x|2 + |F x|2)ds.
0 1 1
If J1 is to be finite then this integral must be bounded as t-*00* For the
and F^x = 0
i = 1,... ,n 
j = 1,2
This must be true for all unstable eigenvalues of A, therefore
X + ( A )  C J1(F1,F2)
but if condition i) holds then by Lemma 3.3
integral to be bounded, we must have
Cx = 0, F^x = 0,
SO j • i i -I
C A x  = y Cx = 0
F„A1-1x = y1_1F.x = 0 
J J
but this implies that
xE ^  (F^  yF^ ) *
so
^i{Fi ’V  ■ ♦
X+ (A) = 4>
which for any F2 is equivalent to
*+ <A + B l V  C R 2(Fl).
2Thus (A+B^F^ ^ 2) is stabilizable by DM . So we have shown that if is to 
be finite then DM"*" must choose F^ such that (A+B^F2>B2) is stabilizable.
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Part 2
There exists an F^ such that Re(A(AjR^(0)) < 0  and so 
R1(0)nx+ (A+B1F1) = 0.
But by condition ii)
^ ( ^ . O )  C $ *  C R* C R^(0) .
Theretore
x+ (A+B1F1) n ^ ( ^ , 0 )  =
i.e., the system is detectable for such an F^. The system is also stabi- 
lizable for such an F , therefore the follower's resultant control F^ will 
cause the system (A+B^F^+B^F^) to be asymptotically stable and J ^ < c» and
J2<C°*
Part 3
In the previous sections we have established that there exists an 
F^ such that the triple
(c2.(a + b 1f1)!b 2)
will be stabilizable and detectable and that in order for the leader to have 
a finite cost, such an F^ must be chosen. So, the optimal F*, if it exists, 
must make the system stabilizable and detectable. It remains to establish 
that a minimizing control exists. If we can establish that the minimizing 
control, F*, if it exists, will be contained in a closed bounded set U and 
that the leaders cost function is continuous with respect to F^ over the set 3* , 
they by the Weierstrass theorem the minimum is attained in 3, i.e., F*
exists [24].
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From this, Lemma 3.7 follows. From Lemma 3.7
h c C
and the optimization can be done over a closed, bounded set over which the 
cost function is continuous in F^. By the Weierstrass theorem an optimal 
stabilizing solution exists.
3.4. Verification of Conditions
Most of the conditions for the existence of a stabilizing solution 
can be tested by well established techniques. The controllability of (A,B), 
where B = B^jB^ is a concatenation of B^ and B^, is readily checked as well as 
the positive definiteness of the various matrices. Checking the condition
r 2 c
however deserves some further discussion.
The subspace j?* is the supremal (A,B^)-invariant subspace contained 
in 7\{Cy) • Algorithms for calculating a set of vectors which span a 
supremal subspace have been considered by a number of authors, most notably 
in [26], where attention is paid to the computation reliable components of 
supremal subspaces by algorithms whose stability and efficiency can be insured.
The subspace R* is defined as the largest space J  such that 
> C R  (F^) over all possible F^. That is, R* is the greatest lower bound, in 
the sense of subspace inclusion, for the set of The inclusion of
within R* is to be tested for and so, although it is not clear how to 
efficiently calculate R* exactly, any computed subspace of R* for which the 
inclusion holds is sufficient to establish the desired result. Notice that
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unlike jj*, there does not in general exist an such that 
Relationships that do hold and are useful are
Fu V V  c R1 5 Fn v v
F1 2
We might consider finding the EL (F^ of maximum dimension. The maximum
A A
dimension of R^ ( F^) over all F^ is unique but there is no unique R^(F^) 
with maximum dimension. The calculation of a R?(F^) of minimum dimension (not 
unique), and thus the corresponding R^(F^), can be done by the index and 
decomposition algorithm of [27]. If g ” -^s contained in one such maximum R^(F^) 
then this is sufficient to establish the result. The union of a finite 
collection of arbitrarily generated subspaces R^(F^) might also be considered. 
.As a check, for a finite set of arbitrary F^ and a candidate space a^CR*, if
n R (F ) (3.4)
finite 1 z 
set of
F2
then R* since the right hand side of (3.4) is an upper bound for R*.
3.5. Conclusions
Conditions have been derived which are sufficient to insure the 
existence of stabilizing feedback gains which satisfy the Stackelberg strategy. 
These conditions are sufficient and less restrictive conditions may exist. 
Although it is possible to insure the existence of a minimizing control for 
the leader, the computation of an optimal F^ has not yet been dealt with and
requires investigation.
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CHAPTER 4
AN EXAMPLE OF THE IMPACT OF THE INFORMATION STRUCTURE
4.1. Introduction
In noncooperative decentralized decision making, the information 
available to the controllers has a far more significant role than in the 
case of a centralized, or even decentralized, single objective control problem. 
In Chapters 4 and 5 we will investigate the Nash strategy and the role that 
the information structure has in the determination of the controls and the 
resultant cost incurred by each controller. In Chapter 4 an example is 
presented and discussed in which a decision maker becomes worse off when 
more information is made available to him. This demonstrates that more 
information is not necessarily better and, more generally, it demonstrates 
that the choice of an information structure must be done in a systematic 
fashion. In Chapter 5 such a systematic approach is developed.
4.2. An Example
A problem in which there are many controllers, each having a 
different objective, can be formulated as a differential game with the 
controllers acting according to a particular strategy. In a decentralized 
problem, where each controller has different, incomplete information, the 
information structure can have a significant and sometimes surprising impact 
on the solution.
We examine a fairly realistic problem of a two-area electric power 
distribution system in which the two area controllers determine constant 
output feedback gains according to Nash strategy. An example demonstrates a
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situation in which one controller is worse off when more information is made 
available to him.
This phenomenon has been noted previously [28], [29], and [30] 
for static and one-step dynamic systems where the amount of information 
is characterized in terms of the statistics of noisy measurements. We 
consider a differential game where the controllers apply output feedback of 
perfect measurements. The amount of information is characterized in the 
following sense. Decision maker i (DM.) measures y.=C.x. where x is thel i l l
state of the system and Ch is a matrix of appropriate dimension. We say that 
1 2y . = C ,, x is more informative than y. = C.„x if (R(c!-. ) 3<R(C’ ) where <R (A) : i l l  i i2 ll i2
1 2range space of the matrix A, i.e., y^ is composed of the measurements y_^  (to 
within an isomorphic transformation) plus additional linearly independent 
measurement(s).
The effect of the information structure seems counter-intuitive 
at first, but will be readily understood once the significance of the 
navailability" of information is explained in terms of the strategy being 
employed.
4.3. The System
We consider a two area electric power distribution system with a 
tie-line interconnection. The model is based on [31]. Each area has a 
steam plant and is modeled by a fifth order system, the states of which are 
the deviations of the area frequency, the actuator position and the power 
outputs of a high pressure turbine, an intermediate pressure turbine and a 
low pressure turbine. The two subsystems along with the tie-line power flow
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comprise an eleventh order system. The load disturbance of each area is 
modeled by a first order system so the combined power and disturbance systems 
comprise a thirteenth order model.
The model is the two interconnected system model for steam powered 
plants derived in [31]. The model is a linearization of the system about an 
operating point, describing the system behavior under real power and frequency 
variations. The state vector is
x^ - valve displacement - area one
- power displacement of high pressure turbine - area one
x^ - power displacement of intermediate pressure turbine - area one
x^ - power displacement of low pressure turbine - area one
x^ - frequency deviation in area one
x^ - tie-line power flow deviation - from area one into area two 
x^ - valve displacement - area two
x0 - power displacement of high pressure turbine - area twoO
x^ - power displacement of intermediate pressure turbine - area two
x^q - power displacement of low pressure turbine - area two
x ^  - frequency deviation in area two 
x ^  “ load disturbance in area one 
x^^ _ load disturbance in area two.
The controls are
Uj - set point adjustment in area one
- set point adjustment in area two.
In case one, DM, measures xc and in both cases, DM„ measures x „ . The 1 3  2 11
system can be represented as
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x =
where
A =s
As —a.^ 0 a3 0
a2 ~a2 0 0
0 ai As 0 a3
0 0 0 AA
-2. 0 0 0
4.75 -5 • 0 0
0 .16667 -. 16667 0
0 0 2. -2
Ji_____
i
o
__
__
f \----
o1____
x +
0 U1 + b u2 +
1
o
____1
E
a2 = [0 I 0 I 0 I 0 I 22.21439]
a3 A  ■
.01 0
0 -.01
0 
0 
0 
0
0 .025 .02333 .035 -.1125
.023685 1 
0 
0 
0
-.08333
4.
0
b = 0 E =
0 
0
The criterion and covariance matrices are
-6
0
0
0
0
.08333
1. 0
0 1
R = 1. V =
10
0 10-6
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Q1 = Q = .28 / Unit penalty on total area power generation.
3.3 Z9,9
Qi = Q? = -42j
4.4 10,10
Q-, = Q9 = 100.
5.5 11,11
The Nash game will determine the gains of each of the area 
controllers. We assume that in the steady state, each DM will meet the load 
demand in his own area, i.e., the steady state power generated in area i is 
equal to the steady state load in area i. For simplicity, the feedforward 
gain from the area load disturbance is calculated such that if a step 
increase in load were to occur then the controller for that area alone would, 
in the steady state, meet the new demand. Thus these feedforward gains are 
calculated from algebraic steady state conditions and are not considered as 
control variables in the Nash calculations.
The problem faced by each of the DMers is to minimize his average 
steady state cost when the system is subject to constantly varying load 
disturbances.
The overall system is of the form
x = Ax + B2ui + B2U2 +
X A.. A By ’ ” o"
, A = ± £ , B. = 1 , E =
z 0 A„ l 0 Eu 3 J u ~ - J
The dimensions of these submatrices correspond to the dimensions of x and z, 
where x is the system state, z is the load disturbance, and v is a white noise 
process with zero mean and covariance V.
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For i=l,2 DM. has measurement y. = C.x and will apply linear i 1 1
output feedback u.=-F.y.. DM.'s cost function can be expressed [25] 1 1 1 1
J. = lim 1/2E{x(t),Q.x(t)+u.(t)'R..u.(t)}
t-^00 v
which, with feedback is
li l
J. = lim x>2 E{x(t) ’ (Q. + C!F!R. .F.C.)x(t) }.
t->co V
If we define the matrix
i l li l l
S = lim E{x(t)x(t)’} 
v
then
J. = % tr{S(Q.+ C!F!R..F.C.)}.
i xi l l li l l
The feedback gains F* and F* are Nash equilibrium values if
V F p F * ) for all admissible F^ (4.1)
J2( F p F p for all admissible F^. (4.2)
By application of the matrix minimum principle (32), [33], and [25], 
the following necessary conditions for the Nash equilibrium output feedback 
gains are obtained, i = l ,2.
9J. io = — ~  = r ..f .c .s c : - b :p .s c :9F. n  l l l i i  ii
(4.3)
0 = Q. + C!F|R..F.C. + A'P. + P.Al l i n  l l l l (4.4)
0 = EVE’ + AS + SAr (4.5)
A = (A-B1F1C1-B2F2C2).
Each controller’s primary concern is to minimize the frequency 
deviations in his own area. The cost functions are symmetric in the sense 
that each controller penalizes his own area frequency deviations, his area 
power generation deviations and his own control actions.
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In the example, we compare the Nash equilibrium solutions for two 
information structures. In case one, each DM measures his own area frequency 
deviations, and in case two, DM^ has no measurement available for feedback 
and DM^ still measures his own area frequency deviation.
In order to compare solutions for different information structures, 
there must exist a unique solution for each case. We have established that 
the Nash equilibrium solutions exist and are unique for this problem by direct 
numerical calculations of the reaction curves of each controller. In order to 
make such graphical analysis, it is necessary to restrict the number of 
measurements available to each controller for feedback. Also, some simplistic 
assumptions in defining each controller's criterion function are necessary to 
insure uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium solutions, i.e., the explicit 
appearance of a penalty on the tie-line power flow deviation in the criterion 
functions would result in multiple equilibrium solutions under these particular 
information structures. Although it is not penalized, the steady state tie­
line power flow deviation would in fact be zero under constant load distur­
bances as a result of the constraint that each controller alone must, in the 
steady state, meet a constant load demand in his own area and the fact that 
the resultant overall system is stable.
These assumptions regarding the criterion function and the number 
of available measurements are needed to produce a clear, simple example and 
are not meant to accurately represent a situation that might be encountered 
in practice, particularly not for such a small scale system. It is in large 
scale systems in which such restricted information availability can be 
expected and in which the impact of the information structure becomes most
important.
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For comparison we have also calculated the solution for the 
Stackelberg strategy for the information structure of case one with DM^ as 
leader. With the Stackelberg strategy, the controllers do not determine 
their controls simultaneously, as with the Nash strategy, but rather one 
controller, the leader, will first determine his control and announce his 
decision to the other controller, the follower, who will then determine his 
control knowing what the leader’s control will be. The leader, in deter­
mining his control, takes into account the follower's subsequent optimization. 
It is assumed that the leader will not deviate from his announced controls 
and that the leader knows the follower’s cost function and is thus able to 
calculate the follower's reaction to his controls. For a given information 
structure, the leader will do at least as well as he would playing according 
to the Nash strategy. Further details and discussion of the Stackelberg 
strategy can be found in [2], [8], [7], [34], and [6].
The solutions are shown in Figure 4.1. The reaction
curves of the two DM's are plotted (where u. = -k.y. = -k.f., fa is the fre-l l i  l i 1
quency deviation for area i) and the various solutions are indicated. RCk 
indicates DFL’s reaction curve, N1 is the Nash equilibrium solution for case 
one, N2 is the Nash equilibrium solution for case two, and S indicates the 
Stackelberg solution with DM^ as leader.
Table 1 summarizes the various solutions and the related costs.
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Figure 4.1. Reaction curves and equilibrium points.
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Table 1. Resulting Costs for Example
CONTROL GAINS COSTS (xlO 5)
DM1 2DM DM1 DM2
Nash 
(case 1)
+.40815 +.40815 6.29 6.29
Nash 
(case 2)
0 +1.02695 3.49 11.4
Stackelberg 
DM"*-: leader
-.199 +1.4171 3.19 14.49
Going down the table we can see that DM^'s cost decreases as we 
go from case one to case two and from case two to the Stackelberg case. It 
so happens for this problem that DM^’s cost is increasing as we go down the 
table. This is not always the case; examples can be constructed in which 
both DM's are better off when less information is available to one of them and 
it is also possible that both DMers can have lower cost when using the 
Stackelberg strategy than when using the Nash strategy [2],
4.4. Discussion
One might reasonably expect that, regardless of the presence of 
other controllers, if more information is made available to one of the 
controllers, then that controller would be better off. Why, in case one 
of the example, could not DM^ simply ignore the available information, 
reducing the problem to that of case two? The answer to this, it turns out, 
is the key to understanding the phenomenon.
The Nash equilibrium conditions, inequalities (4.1) and (4.2) can 
equivalently be thought of as follows. Each controller is performing an 
optimization, minimizing his cost function over his entire set of admissible
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controls, subject to the constraint that the other controller is performing 
his minimization over his entire set of admissible controls (i.e., over all 
linear feedback rules for the set of available measurements). In order to 
have a Nash equilibrium, the optimizations must be consistent; each DM's 
control must be the optimal over his entire admissible set of controls given 
that the other DM is applying his Nash control, i.e., inequalities (1) and (2) 
must hold. Since each controller is assuming that the other controller is 
optimizing over his entire set of admissible controls, they are each con­
strained by the consistency requirement to optimize over their own entire set 
of admissible controls. So, inherent in the Nash inequalities is the constraint 
that each DM must optimize over all admissible controls; measurements cannot 
be ignored.
This requirement for consistancy is what constrains the controllers 
to use the information in a way that could possibly be detrimental to all of 
the controllers. Is it possible for a controller to avoid this requirement, 
allowing him to ignore information? Yes, with the Stackelberg strategy, this 
is accomplished by the leader. By simply allowing for a precedence of 
decision making, the Stackelberg strategy frees the leader of the requirement 
that his control must be optimal for the given reaction of the follower. This 
not only allows the leader to ignore information, if appropriate, but, as 
demonstrated in the example, he can use the information to his advantage.
In this chapter, we have presented an example which demonstrates 
that if a dynamic system is to be controlled by more than one controller, and 
the controllers are acting according to the Nash equilibrium strategy, then 
a change in the information available to one or more of the controllers can
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have a surprising effect. In particular, making more information available 
to one of the controllers does not necessarily bring about improved 
performance.
In the next chapter we will consider techniques for changing the 
information structure used in a Nash strategy with the goal of improving some 
measure of the overall system performance.
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CHAPTER 5
INFORMATION DESIGN
5.1. Introduction
In conventional single criterion optimizations, the design of an 
optimal information structure generally reduces to either the determination 
of the most informative structure which satisfies certain measurement con­
straints or to precisely defining the tradeoffs between the cost of acquiring 
information and the value this information has in terms of its effect on the 
performance of the control system [35], [36], and [37]. As was demonstrated 
in the previous chapter, the effect that the information available to one 
of the controllers has on his performance or on the performance of the other 
controllers is not quite so self-evident when the decisions are being made 
according to the Nash strategy. Also, the definition of overall system 
performance must be made precise if it is to be used in the design of a 
"better" information structure.
In this chapter we will develop an approach to the design of the 
information structure that will provide improved performance for the overall 
system. In order to do this, the design of the information structure for a 
system in which the controllers are choosing their controls according to a 
Nash equilibrium strategy must incorporate a precedence relationship, i.e., 
the Nash equilibrium solution for the controls is done for a given, specified 
information structure. The information design is not itself a part of the 
Nash equilibrium conditions but rather is done taking into account the 
subsequent optimizations being performed according to the Nash strategy. In 
this sense, the designer of the information structure is behaving as the
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leader would in a Stackelberg strategy when his control is the information 
system. The optimization for the information structure must append the sub­
sequent optimizations of the individual DMers.
5.2. The Design Technique
The particular formulation that we will consider is as follows.
A linear system with m controllers acting on it is represented by
m
x = Ax + E B.u.. (5.1)
i=l 1 i
The ith controller has measurements
y . = C.x (5.2)i i
and will apply a linear output feedback
u. = -F.y. = -F.C.x (5.3)l l i  l i
in an effort to minimize the cost function
f m
J. = E{ x + % [  (x'Q.x + Zu!R..u.)dt} (5.4)1 xQ f if f i j=l J !J 3
where the expectation over x^ is to remove the dependence of the solution on 
the initial condition.
The information structure is determined by the output matrices, Ch,
in (5.2).
We will develop the information design procedure for the case of 
linear, static output feedback control (5.3). The extension to the case of 
the controllers using dynamic compensation of fixed order is straightforward 
and conceptually equivalent [38].
The Nash equilibrium output feedback gains
u. = -F*y.l l i
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are defined as those gains which satisfy the inequalities
t (-p* 17* -p* ]p* F*') < j (y * F* F F* f ';?)-• ^  »* * * ’ i-l’ i’ i+1’ * * ‘ ’ m; i^ 1 ’ ’ i-l’ i ’ i+1’ * * * ’1 l m
for all F^, i = l ,2,...,m. (5.5)
For a given, fixed information structure, (5.2), the necessary conditions 
for the output feedback gains can be determined by use of the matrix 
minimum principle [32] and [33]. We will develop these first, in terms of a 
fixed information structure, and then develop the information design stage.
The cost functions (5.4) can equivalently be written
where
and X satisfies
J. = h2/ tr{Q.X}dt + tr{K._X }
1 t 1 lf tto
m
q . = q . + z c !f !r ..F.C. 
i i j = n  j ij j j
X = AX + XA’
(5.6)
(5.7)
X(t ) = X = E{x x T} o o o o
m
A = (A- E B.F.C.) . 
j=l J J J
The Hamiltonian is formed, appending the matrix differential equation (5.7), 
H (X, A ,F ; j=l,. . . ,m) = V2 [ tr{Q .X} + tr{ A. (AX+ XA* ) }], i=l,...,m.1 1 J l x
From the matrix minimum principle, the minimization of (5.6) with respect 
to F^ in accordance with the Nash strategy (5.5) yields the following 
necessary conditions
A. = -Q. - A A. - A.Ax i l i (5.8i)
A.(tf) = K.f
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3H.
-r— - = o = r ..f .c .x c ! - b !a .x c ! i = 1,2,.. . ,m.3F. 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 (5.9i)1
If the feedback gains were constrained to be constant throughout the 
interval [tQ ,t^) then the condition F^= 0 would be appended in the Hamiltonian 
which would result in equation (5.9i) being replaced by
3J. f 3H.
— i = /3F. i 9F.i t  1o
dt 0,
i.e. , for fixed
R..f .c .p c ! - b !a .p c !ii i i l l i  l (5.9i’)
whe re t ^
P = / X(t)dt. 
to
For a given information structure (5.2), the control gains must 
satisfy (5.7), (5.8i), and (5.9i) for i=l,...,m. These equations are a 
two-point boundary value problem and must he solved iteratively. Since 
expressions for the gradients are known (5.9i) or (5.9i!), gradient dependent 
schemes for solving the equations are applicable. Convergence of any approach 
cannot be assured a priori in that the existence of an equilibrium solution is 
itself not assured.
We now have a characterization of the behavior of the individual 
controllers in thier determination of feedback gains for a given information 
structure. The second phase of the problem, the design of the information 
structure, can now be developed.
We assume that the information matrices will be chosen to minimize
a cost function
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r mJ = !/ E{ / (x’Q x+ E u !r ,u,)dt + x ’K ^x_}. o 2 x ; o j=l j oj j f of f
It is assumed that this cost function, in some sense, represents an overall 
system cost which is to be minimized by the choice of the C matrices. This 
might, for example, be a Pareto-optimal cost function agreed on by all of the 
individual decision makers, i.e., if they agree on the relative importance
of their individual costs as expressed by the a^'s then
m m
J = E a.J., a.>0, E a. = l.
° i=l 1 1 i 1=1. i
Alternately, the overall cost function might be a Lyapunov function in which 
case the information structure is chosen to provide stabilization under the 
subsequent control actions.
The optimization for the CL’s is done with each CL held to a fixed 
allowable maximum rank. Therefore as a special case, one may allow each 
CL to attain a maximum rank equal to the dimension of the system thereby 
admitting full state feedback as an allowable information structure. Note 
that full state feedback will not necessarily result as being the optimum 
structure since, as was demonstrated in the previous chapter, more informa­
tion is not necessarily better. More realistically, there may be only a 
limited set of measurements available to begin with, e.g., certain states may 
not be directly measurable at all or only certain states are measurable by 
certain controllers, allowing for conditions such as geographic separation. 
These conditions can be treated by assuming the measurements to be in the 
form
y . = C.D.x, i = 1,...,ml i i
where D. is a fixed matrix and, as before, CL is the matrix to be determined i i
in the optimization.
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Certain special cases are of interest. In particular, if for 
some i, an initial guess for the information structure is taken to be Ck = I, 
Ck = 0, j^i, then decision maker i is faced with a conventional full state 
feedback optimization and the remaining controllers are constrained to take 
no action. This provides a convenient starting point for the iterative 
calculation of the information structure.
The necessary conditions for the information structure design are 
presented in the sequel.
For the given J , the Hamiltonian is formed to append the necessary 
conditions which characterize the Nash equilibrium solution for the feedback 
gains.
m
H = Vo tr{(Q + I ClFiR .F.C.)X}O 2 O j=! J J OJ J J
m m
+ £ V2 tr{P .[-Q.-A’A.-A.A- £ (ClFjR..F.C.-C!F!B!A -A.B.F.C.)]}
j=l °J J J 3 i=l i i 31 i i i i i J J i i i
+ , V tr{Bo£[R£ d £ C£XC; - W Cd }
m m
+ V2 tr{T [(A- £ B .F .C .)Z + X(A’- £ c !f !b !)]}. o j=l 3 3 J j=l 3 3 3
By the matrix minimum principle the necessary conditions are found to be 
the following;
3H
— rr- = 0 = R .F.C.XC 3F. 03 3 3 3
m
+ £ (-R, .F.C.P .C! +B.A. P ,0!) :=1 3^ 3 3 03 3 3 k ok 3
+ R.. .C.XC! - B. XC!, JJ oj 3 j 3 o j 3 = 1,.•.,m (5.10)
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9H’ m
r  = --------2. = _ { Q  +  E c ! F ! R .F .C .
o  9X x o  j = l  J ]  o j  ]  j
m
+ 4£1 icis;tRM F»ct + c iFiR« Boici]
m
- J; rci B; * Bi V Ai V i i Cl] + A  ri + r iA} (5.11)
where m
A = (A- ZB.F.C.) 3=1 J 3 3
r (t,) = k fo f of
o£
9H m
_ 2 .  = _ { Ap - p  a ’ + z [ B . F . C . P  0 + p 0c; f ; b ; i9A o£ oi k=l k k k o£ o£ k k k
- V o A X-XC^ £ BP ’ Po£(to) = ° ’ (5.12)
9H' rn
0 = — 2- = F’R .F.C.X- Z [FJR..F.C.P .-FlBlA.P .-P .A.B.F.] 3C. i li i l 3=1 l ji l i oj l i j oj oj j l il J
+ 3 ’ R..F C. + f :r ..3 .C.x + 3 t .B ! A .X - F !B I r  X, i = 1,...,m. (5.13)01 11 1 1 1 11 Ol 1 Ol 1 1 1 1 0
Or, for the optimal time-invariant C^’s, equation (5.13) is 
replaced by
9J? lf 9HO _ r __O
3C. “ l 3C.i t  l
dt = 0
o
which follows from appending the conditions
(5.13’)
C. = 0. i
For a given information structure, the feedback gains are found 
by solving (5.7), (5.8i), and (5.9i) for i=l,...,m. This provides us with 
the F^, X, and the A , i=l,...,m. The equations (5.11) and (5.12) are then 
solved for and P for i=l,...,m where the algebraic equations of (5.10) 
are solved to eliminate the 3q  ^ for i=l,...,m. The gradient (5.13) or (5.13’)
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can now be evaluated, new C^'s determined, and the process is repeated 
until convergence is obtained or an adequate improvement in performance 
is attained.
The amount of computation is quite significant but, fortunately, 
these computations are done once only and are done by only one decision maker 
at the time the information structure is being chosen. These computations 
are transparent to all of the individual controllers since they merely 
determine their feedback gains for the information structure which, at that 
time, is determined and fixed. Thus, the precedence relationship of the 
optimizations isolates the individual controllers from the major computa­
tional task of the information structure design. This is a similar effect 
to the advantage found in the sampled data formulation of Chapter 2. The 
case in which the available information is restricted, as represented by
y. = C.D.x 1 l i
is conceptually equivalent and the necessary conditions are developed along 
identical lines.
For the case in which the problem is defined over an infinite 
horizon, the necessary conditions for the output feedback gains and for the 
information structure matrices reduce to a set of algebraic equations.
For this case, the final necessary conditions reduce to the
following.
For a given information structure, the output feedback gains 
must satisfy
m
A ’A. + A.A + Q. + Z C!FlR..F.C. = 0 i i i j=l J ] iJ ] J (5.14)
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where
AL + LA’ + X = 0  o
3 J.
0 = — 1 = r . . f . c .lc ! -  b !A.lc !9F. li l l l l i  ll
m
A = (A- E B.F.C.)i=l i i i
for i =1,2,...,m.
The conditions for the optimal information structure are 
_ m
T A + A ’r + £ {C I e (F. .F.C.-B A.) + (C! F ! R. .-A .B . ) 3 . C . }
j=l J J jj J 3 J J 3 ] ]] J J J J
m
+ Q + £ C!F!R .F C. = 0o j=i 3 3 °J J J
(5.15)
(5.16)
(5.17)
m T
0 = R .F.C.LC! - B!TLC! + R..3.C.LC! + E {-B . A P C ! + R, .F.C.P.C!} (5.18) oj J J J J J 33 3 3 3 k=l 3 k k  j X j j j k 3
which is solved to eliminate the g.'s,
J
m
'l Z Z0 - AW  +
3 J m
(5.19)
0 = — - = F!R,.F.C.L - E [F|R..F.C.P.-FJBIA.P.-P.A.B.F.]
l j=l i j i i i j  i i j j  3 3 i i 
+ 3lR. .F.C. + F!R. .B.C.L + 3!b !A.L-FlBlTL i = 1, . . . ,m. (5.20)l i i i i  l i i i i  i l l  l i
An iterative procedure is possible using the gradient information 
supplied by (5.20).
Equation (5.18) is used to remove the dependence of (5.17), (5.19), 
and (5.20) on the $ 1 s
-R.^R .F.C.LCl-B.rLC! JJ °J 3 3 3 3 3
m
+ Ek=l
and if Ch is not full rank, the equation is still solvable since
(RCCjLCp = «(cp
for L>0, where <R(-) denotes range space.
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5.3. An Example
For a simple example to demonstrate the improvement in performance 
attainable through changes in the information structure, consider the 
following.
The system
x = Ax + + B2U2
is second order with u^ and u^ both scalar
-10 0 
0 -10
-1
Bi = +i
+1
]R =2 -1 _
u. = -f.y. = -f.C.x.i i i  l i
The information structure is given by
1C1 = c2 =
/2
[1 1].
The cost functions
J. = b, E{/ (x’Q.x+ ulR. .u. )dt} 
i o 1 i ii i
are specified by
0 0
0 1000
1000 0
0 0
R. . = 1ii
and
i=l,2.
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For this given nominal information structure, the behavior of the controller 
is best illustrated by calculating their reaction curves. One to the 
symmetry of the problem, the reaction curves are symmetric with respect to 
one another across the 45° line. Figure 5.1 illustrates the reaction curves 
where f^(f ) denotes controller i's optimal feedback gain as a function of 
f , j^i, i=l,2. The intersection of the reaction curves is the point which 
satisfies the Nash inequalities. At the Nash equilibrium point,
for which
J = v2 J, + %  J0 = 47. o 1 2 2
Now let us consider the effect that a change in the information structure can 
have.
We will consider variations in the information structure para­
meterized in terms of one parameter as follows:
Let
= [sin(0) cos(0)]
C2 = [cos(0) sin(0)].
Notice that by parameterizing the information structure in terms of 0, we 
are maintaining
IIC. (0)11 = 1.
Variation of 0 is a rotation of the measurement vectors in state space.
The reaction curves and equilibrium points for a few values of 0 
are shown in Figure 5.2.
In particular, the optimal value of 0 is found to be 0= -45° for 
which Jq = 16.3. The reaction curves for this case are shown in Figure 5.2c).
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Figure 5.1. Reaction curves for nominal information structure.
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fl
Figure 5.2b. Reaction curves for 0 = 0 .
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fr
Figure 5.2c. Reaction curves for 0 = -45.
fl
Figure 5.2d. Reaction curves for 0 = -60.
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For this information structure the costs incurred by each controller and the 
overall cost are all reduced to approximately one-third of their values 
for the original nominal information structure which corresponds to 0 = +45°.
5.4. Conclusions
The optimization for the information structure must append the 
necessary conditions which characterize the subsequent calculations for the 
Nash equilibrium solution. The continuity of the Nash equilibrium conditions 
with respect to the parameters of the information structure is not insured 
and requires further investigation if any assurances are sought for a well 
behaved, convergent algorithm. In fact, an algorithm for the calculation of 
Nash equilibrium output feedback gains for a given information structure with 
conditions which guarantee convergence would be significant in its own right.
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS
The decentralized control problem where the individual controllers 
have different goals has been considered. We have focused on the role of the 
Stackelberg strategy, particularly for its application for the coordination 
of many controllers.
Several issues related to the applicability of the strategy have 
been dealt with, resulting in tractable, efficient algorithms. The structure 
of the solution to a sampled data formulation has been exploited to obtain 
particularly efficient solution techniques.
The existence of solutions satisfying the Stackelberg strategy 
cannot in general be assured a priori. Conditions sufficient for guaranteeing 
the existence of a solution satisfying a Stackelberg strategy have been 
developed. These are merely sufficient conditions and there is need for 
further development.
The impact that the information structure can have on a solution 
satisfying the Nash strategy has been illustrated by means of an example.
The example serves as motivation for the next section in which an approach 
to the design of the information structure has been developed which exploits 
the precedence nature of the Stackelberg strategy. The information structure 
alone is manipulated in an effort to coordinate the subsequent actions of 
the controllers. As with most coordination schemes using the Stackelberg 
strategy, the activities of the leader or coordinator are transparent to the
individual controllers.
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